Agent Privilege Escalation
Testing whether an AI agent operating under a scoped identity can be manipulated into performing actions beyond its granted privilege.
- Category
- Agentic AI Security
- Difficulty
- Advanced
- Last Updated
- 20 September 2026
Lab detail
Objective
Where an agent runs under its own scoped identity (rather than inheriting a user’s full permissions), the boundary between “what the agent is trusted to do” and “what it is manipulated into doing” is the real security question. This lab will build a reference agent with a deliberately scoped identity/role and test whether that scope can be escalated through prompt manipulation, chained tool calls or confused-deputy patterns.
Planned Scope
- Build a reference agent with an explicit, narrower-than-user permission scope.
- Test direct requests, chained tool calls and confused-deputy scenarios for scope escalation.
- Test interaction with a second, more-privileged agent or service as an escalation path.
- Document identity and authorization patterns that hold the intended boundary.
Framework Mapping
Referenced frameworks
Exact control-ID mappings are to be validated as this lab progresses — see the full Frameworks reference.
Responsible Use / Safety Notes
How this lab is run
This lab uses synthetic data and controlled environments. It is intended to demonstrate defensive AI-security principles and does not contain customer data, production credentials or intentionally weaponized exploit infrastructure.
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