Shah AI Security Lab / Labs

ASL-012Planned

Agent Privilege Escalation

Testing whether an AI agent operating under a scoped identity can be manipulated into performing actions beyond its granted privilege.

Category
Agentic AI Security
Difficulty
Advanced
Last Updated
20 September 2026
  • agentic-ai
  • privilege-escalation
  • identity

Lab detail

Objective

Where an agent runs under its own scoped identity (rather than inheriting a user’s full permissions), the boundary between “what the agent is trusted to do” and “what it is manipulated into doing” is the real security question. This lab will build a reference agent with a deliberately scoped identity/role and test whether that scope can be escalated through prompt manipulation, chained tool calls or confused-deputy patterns.

Planned Scope

  • Build a reference agent with an explicit, narrower-than-user permission scope.
  • Test direct requests, chained tool calls and confused-deputy scenarios for scope escalation.
  • Test interaction with a second, more-privileged agent or service as an escalation path.
  • Document identity and authorization patterns that hold the intended boundary.

Framework Mapping

Referenced frameworks

Exact control-ID mappings are to be validated as this lab progresses — see the full Frameworks reference.

  • OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications
  • MITRE ATLAS

Responsible Use / Safety Notes

How this lab is run

This lab uses synthetic data and controlled environments. It is intended to demonstrate defensive AI-security principles and does not contain customer data, production credentials or intentionally weaponized exploit infrastructure.

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